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Abstract—Through advanced sensor technologies, satellite-
based authentication, and high bandwidth data networks, Remote
Condition Monitoring (RCM) systems are now an essential
‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) resource for efficient operation of
railway infrastructure. However, the full potential of this big
data has yet to be realized. Data is currently collected and
used in siloes, with limited visibility of all possible datasets
for exploitation. The RSSB on behalf of the UK Rail Industry
established a cross-industry research program, T1010, to build
stronger cooperation between stakeholders in sharing RCM data.
This research builds upon T1010, to explore the use of blockchain
and smart contracts to automate, in an auditable and tamper-
proof way, the commercial agreements and payment processes
for data trading. By removing the limitations of paper-based
agreements, our goal is to enable innovation in shared business
processes and an IoT data marketplace. Building on existing
smart contract-based schemes for trading and sharing IoT data
over blockchain networks, this research identifies novel ways
to enforce agreements and ensure fair cost attribution between
parties, without a Trusted Third Party. The initial design of a
blockchain-based framework is presented, oriented around the
data provider, consumer, and smart contracts. Blockchain-hosted
data access agreement and accounting models are specified in
detail. The processors in the efficient permissioned blockchain
platforms Hyperledger Fabric, Sawtooth, and Iroha have been
analyzed for their suitability for implementation. We then outline
our future work to evaluate and validate two industrial use cases:
monitoring systems for unattended overhead line equipment and
axle bearings.
Index Terms—Big data, Blockchain, Remote Condition Moni-
toring, Cost attribution, Process automation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pursuit towards higher quality services in the railway
industry is a continuous process. Many technologies have been
integrated to support a transformation from a mechanic and
electronic-based environment to a more informatics-based one.
Remote condition Monitoring (RCM) is one prevalent technol-
ogy that is used to enhance the maintainability, accessibility,
safety, and reliability level of the whole railway system. By
applying this technology, detecting and diagnosing persistent
and imminent faults will be possible. Thereby, preventive
maintenance could be achieved, which helps in avoiding
breakdowns of the system and costly failures and delays. To
this end, advanced computing and sensing have become a core
issue to fulfill the increasing demand for monitoring the health
of railway assets throughout the day and enabling maintenance
to be done in a timely fashion. Therefore, more sensors and
smart devices are integrated continuously and are generating
data on a massive scale. In general, activities in railway
RCM can be classified into four main categories (quadrants)
based on the monitoring sensor location and which asset they
are monitoring, namely train monitoring train, infrastructure
monitoring infrastructure, train monitoring Infrastructure, and
infrastructure monitoring train [1]. Smart sensors mounted on
assets belong to one stakeholder but used to monitor assets
belonging to another will be in the quadrant train monitoring
infrastructure and vice versa. An example is sensors mounted
on fixed infrastructure that are used for checking wheel flats on
rolling stock [2]. In such a situation, a stakeholder accruing
the business benefit from using the system may not be the
one who pays the cost of installing and operating the sensing
hardware. As a result, adopting technologies that have net
business benefits to the whole system in the rail industry
may not be a main goal for most stakeholders. This issue is
encountered in many industrial systems and is expected to be
exacerbated by the emergence of the availability of Internet of
Things (IoT) technology.
To solve this issue, it is essential to build stronger co-
operation between rail industry stakeholders with equipment
either mounted on trains to monitor the infrastructure or on
the infrastructure to monitor trains. This cooperation will lead
to a full exploitation of RCM in the rail industry by sharing
of RCM data across the rail industry. Therefore, the RSSB
on behalf of the Cross-Industry Remote Condition Monitoring
Strategy Group established a Cross-Industry RCM (XIRCM)
research program to tackle this issue, namely the T1010
project [3]. The RSSB and Network Rail presented the first
results of this research project at the IET RCM conference
in 2014 [4]. To properly generate business cases for any new
monitoring sensing hardware, it is essential to assign value to
the data generated by one party but used by another. To tackle
the cost issue, it was proposed in project T1010 that a com-
mercial agreement should be made between the parties who
might be involved before installing a new monitoring sensing
system [5]. The commercial agreement has limitations that
hinder complete data management and cost attribution between
stakeholders. It does not solve the need for a trusted third
party to enforce conformance to the agreement. In addition, it
does not provide any evidence for the absence of misbehavior
of the parties involved. Therefore, we believe that leveraging
technology such as blockchain will have more impact on
cost attribution and data delivery between parties and could
solve the aforementioned problems efficiently. The auditable
and secure nature of blockchain technology will encourage
stakeholders to share RCM data and share the cost of their data
in a fair way. As blockchain embodies three main protocols,
decentralization, cryptography, and consensus, adoption of
this technology will promote interoperability among business
processes and stakeholders [6].
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section II,
we will give a brief background about use of RCM data
and blockchain in the rail industry. In section III, related
work will be investigated and discussed. In section IV, our
framework will be described in detail. In sections V and VI,
implementation and future work, and a conclusion will be
presented, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
Blockchain-driven technologies help to improve transac-
tions and make them more efficient and secure due to
the censorship-resistant and tamper-proof digital platforms
of distributed trust provided by this disruptive technology.
Blockchain is still in its infancy and it needs more work
to reach maturity. However, as the technology ecosystem
continues to mature, considerable efforts have been made to
explore its applicability and potential diffusion in different
sectors including the industrial sector [7], [8]. The main
barriers to adopting this disruptive technology in industry
have been investigated and analyzed [9]. In the rail industry,
blockchain-based systems have already been implemented for
ticket sales, invoicing, and freight consignment, among others
[10].
In the UK, a large volume of data is generated daily from
RCM, which is attracting considerable attention as it holds
great value to enhance operation and maintenance of the whole
system. Thus, this is an area of active research and several
projects have been initiated focusing on this area [11]. To
date, railway parties get the information they need by actively
searching for relevant data in different places. In spite of the
availability of different related data sources, accurate delivery
of relevant, timely information to these railway parties is
still inadequate. The multi-party and sensor ecosystem of the
railway industry means that RCM of the railway network has
become an “Internet of Railway Things” (IoRT) [12]. Thus,
integration of state-of-the-art IT, the IoT, cloud computing, and
big data is creating the feasibility of “smart railways” [13].
The data generated in RCM takes several forms depending
on the sensing source of that data, including audio, video, pic-
torial, continuous analogue measurements, and digital thresh-
old signals. The raw data produced will be enhanced and
processed to be used in future analytics to manage the asset
health and lifetime. In condition monitoring, there are six
Fig. 1. The Six Processing Levels of ISO 13374. Source: [14]
recognized levels of data processing as illustrated in Fig.1
[14], ranging from simple data collection, through the sending
of alarms when a certain condition is reached, to a complete
diagnostic capability which includes sending notifications to
the operations and maintenance team to instruct them to fix a
specific asset before it fails.
The source of each data level might belong to different
stakeholders and the value of data becomes greater when the
level of data processing is higher. According to [5], unless
contractual clauses have stated the opposite, the Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) of data recorded by specific equipment
are vested in the party that produced the data, while the IPR of
data resulting from applying an improvement or modification
on others’ data shall be vested in the party who has made
the improvement or modification. To share the data they own,
owners expect some kind of compensation. As such, the value
of data may be evaluated and a “price” set by the owner to be
paid by a consumer for access to the data.
We have to keep in consideration, similar to any trading
environment, that both the data provider and the consumer
need to build a trusted relationship through the trading system.
To this end, the system is expected to enforce that both
provider and consumer conform to the agreement and assure
the accuracy of the data delivered. In addition, it has to
provide a traceable way to allocate any occurrence of data
tampering to be used as evidence that affects processing
payment, compensation, or reimbursement.
In current situations, when one party refrains from making
the agreed payment or service whether consumer or provider,
a Trusted Third Party (TTP) such as a bank, third escrow
mediator, or dispute board might be a necessity which creates
a kind of bureaucracy and introduces additional costs. Thus, to
dispense with the need for a TTP and to protect the monitoring
data provided from being tampered with, blockchain and
smart contracts might be used as they provide immutable
data storage and a supporting trusted payment system. We
can use Smart Contracts (SC) to define all the quantitative
and qualitative terms between providers and consumers in a
tamper-proof manner. An SC is defined as an executable script
deployed to run in the blockchain in a distributed manner [15].
Exploiting the characteristics of blockchain to overcome
the abovementioned threats is our goal in this research. Data
immutability, auditability, decentralization, and the emerging
concept of SC will make it possible to build solutions, taking
RCM in the rail industry to very advanced level. As pointed
out by Christidis and Devetsikiotis [16], an SC can be seen as a
stored procedure in a relational database management system.
By using SCs, a wide range of applications can be developed
based on the underlying execution platform provided by the
blockchain.
In this research, we present an initial design of a blockchain-
based framework which simplifies and automates the cost
attribution process between providers and consumers. By
employing SCs, the provider and consumer will be assured
that their agreement has been enforced and the terms will not
be changed. Moreover, the TTP can be dispensed with as the
SC will work as the trusted mediator.
We can summarize the contribution in the following:
• Translation of agreement terms into blockchain-based
SCs
• Automated and fair cost attribution and service fees
• Transparent and immutable agreements and cost attribu-
tion
• Data IPR processing service
• Integrity-proof data system
III. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed blockchain-
based framework has not been proposed before in the rail
industry or any other industrial area, but research on the
monetization of IoT data based on blockchain technology has
gained in intensity in the few last years. Many have proposed
SC-based schemes for trading and sharing IoT data over a
blockchain network, with models differing from our proposal
totally or partially. In BlockSubPay [17], Oktian et al proposed
a payment protocol using the Ethereum blockchain network.
In their proposal, the network will record subscriptions related
to each user, which could be fixed payment or pay-as-you-
go subscriptions. Initiation of the subscription process will be
off-chain and the cloud provider will provide the client with
the address of the SC that complies with the client’s preferred
payment method. The subscriber will hold a token that is used
to access the provider’s resources on the cloud. The client has
to manage the access tokens they might have if subscribed to
several data providers. In Saranyu [18], Nayak et al proposed
a cloud tenant and service management system similar to
[17], but they used Quorum as the platform, a permissioned
network to implement SCs, and have not provided enough
details about charging tenants. Al-Zahrani [19] also proposed
a subscription-based model for trading cloud services data.
In his proposed model, all subscription requests are recorded
to the ledger, even those for which the payment has not
been completed. In [20], a blockchain-based solution was
implemented using Ethereum to automate both payment and
the issue of random tokens to the IoT owners. The data user
makes an ether deposit when subscribing to a specific IoT
device and before accessing the data which is stored in the
MQTT broker which represents the central point of failure.
Excluding [18], the aforementioned works have not provided
a solution to suspend or revoke the subscription of malicious
users other than removing the data from the cloud resource.
Moreover, in all the mentioned works, the authors assumed an
honest provider and did not discuss the presence of falsified or
garbage data to mislead consumers. The double deposit escrow
has been proposed before in online BitPay [21], BitHalo [22],
and DCSP [23]. In all three, both client and provider build the
escrow through an SC for deposit values only, but the main
payment is done off-chain. To release the escrow, both parties
must confirm the transaction is successful. Otherwise, they
will lose their deposit as they have not provided any dispute
solutions. Asgaonkar and Krishnamachari [24] proposed a
dual-deposit escrow scheme similar to the previous three
schemes but which does provide a dispute solution and include
the main payment. Still, their scheme serves only for one-time
access and the buyer has to evaluate the transaction and send a
response to unlock the escrow and process the payment. If the
buyer does not respond, or was misbehaving, the seller never
gets compensation for that and may lose their deposit and right
to the payment. In [25], a different framework for data sharing
is proposed in which the hash values of data are encrypted
with a symmetrical key and stored off-chain on the cloud by
the provider ahead of the sharing process. All providers will
advertise their data offers and public keys on the cloud. The
SC is generated on fly to provide only one-time access to the
data and the generated agreement will be stored on-chain to be
used for future dispute solutions. The solution they provide to
face any breach through a voting process is not detailed enough
in the description and implementation sections. In our model,
the escrow is released based on the agreement status and our
dispute solutions will assure avoidance of escrow locking or
loss of payment/compensation. The blockchain trilemma [26]
refers to the scalability, decentralization, and security charac-
teristics which cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. Therefore,
all the works discussed above chose to store a large volume
of data off-chain to avoid any scalability issue. Similarly,
scalability has major implications in blockchain applications
in RCM due to the huge volume of data generated of diverse
types. To solve this issue, hash values will be stored on-chain
since they are used as proof of data ownership and will be
used to automate integrity and verify latency claims.
IV. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, the proposed approach is described, and all
introductory information, assumptions, and decisions backing
Fig. 2. Trust Relationship between actors
the framework are illustrated. To inform the design of the
blockchain solution, the trust relationships between actors need
to be identified.
The actors in our proposed future process will be the data
owner (provider), data user (consumer), and blockchain-hosted
SCs, removing the need for the TTP as an actor involved in
the current process.
Fig.2(a) depicts the trust relationship among the actors who
take part in the current cost attribution and payment process.
In this situation, both have to trust that the other party will
comply with the agreement that specifies the cost attribution,
the TTP, and their respective assessment of local financial
cost, henceforth referred to as “local cost monitoring”. Both
provider and consumer have full control of their local cost
monitoring, and this might lead to a dispute as it is not
protected against tampering or misunderstanding. Each party
might have a different or dishonest evaluation for each part
of the signed agreement in terms of service quality. Providers
may pretend to comply with the signed agreement and provide
the demanded service quality they advertised at the beginning.
Based on that, they would expect a cost attribution based on
their own evaluation. On the other side, consumers may pay
more for lower service quality or may get fluctuating quality;
this will affect their evaluation of the cost they should pay.
Both parties may provide evidence to strengthen their point
of view but as there is no trust between them, there will
be no trust in the correctness of their evidence. In addition,
the involvement of a TTP in processing payments, processing
IPR, or solving disputes, will burden the system with all the
consequences of the bureaucracy and its additional costs in
terms of money and time.
Fig.2 (b), depicts the trust relationship in our proposal.
There is no need for a direct trust relationship between
provider and consumer. Both parties focus their trust on the
SCs.
A. Design Decision and Assumptions
Our proposal will be implemented using a permissioned
blockchain network. A trusted authority is needed to authorize
the participation node in the blockchain network. In our
proposal, the Department for Transport (DfT) is our candidate
for this role as it is supposed to be the most neutral party
that dominates the strategic framework for transport services.
Thus, data providers and data consumers will be known to
each other and hold unique membership identities over the
blockchain network. Establishment of identity relies on the
existing identity manager that is often a part of blockchain im-
plementation such as the Membership Service Provider (MSP)
and Certificate Authority (CA) in Hyperledger Fabric [29]. To
maintain scalability, off-chain storage is used, in which some
data can be encrypted and moved to be stored outside the
blockchain. At the same time, references to this data are stored
on-chain and used to confirm the correctness of the off-chain
source data. The SCs, which have the capability to manage
and monitor data transmissions, are able to confirm access
eligibility and data correctness (consumption) in disputation
cases, without recording the actual data on the blockchain.
Since the on-chain data will be available to all parties that are
granted network permissions, confidentiality of sensitive data
such as pricing and cost can still be assured. This is achieved
by adopting encryption methods to protect such sensitive data
from being accessed by parties not directly involved in a
specific data access agreement.
B. Interaction of Actors in the Network
Fig.3, depicts the main interactions between actors in the
blockchain network.
• A provider who has data to trade needs to create an offer
and push it to the network. After accepting the offer,
the provider will be able to upload the hash values of
their data h(data) to the blockchain. This hashed data
will serve as a fingerprint to connect this provider to
the generated data as an owner. It can be used later if
the consumer complains about data integrity or if the
provider complains that other providers are reselling data
and breaching their IPR. It is the provider’s responsibility
to upload and update the hash values regularly to prove
their rights to the generated data and to provide proof of
data integrity to consumers. Offer availability may change
when the provider is no longer able to offer the data, by
changing the Validity attribute to False. As a result, the
provider will not be allowed to upload new hash values
unless they have an ongoing offer. In addition, all ongoing
agreements will be revoked and finalized.
The provider will encrypt the original data which will
be stored off-chain using the consumer’s public key
after signing the data using the provider’s private key.
This will secure the data if any disclosure has occurred.
The signature is important for use later if the consumer
complains about data integrity or data corruption. To this
end, the provider’s signature will be examined to prove
that they are the source of the data. In the rail industry, a
provider could be any stakeholder who funds or operates
sensors for RCM and retains ownership of the generated
data.
• A consumer will be able to list all registered offers and,
when interested in a specific offer, can send a request over
the network. The consumer’s request will be accompanied
by the subscription period to initiate a new payment pro-
cess then a new possible access agreement. By creating
an access agreement, the consumer will be able to access
Fig. 3. main interactions between actors.
the hash values uploaded by the provider to the network
during the period of their ongoing agreement. If the
agreement is terminated due to expiration or revocation,
their access to the hash values will be terminated as well.
In the rail industry, a consumer could be any authorized
stakeholder who needs data to manage and maintain asset
condition.
• SCs are based on the accounting and data access models
adopted, and are expected to monitor cost calculations,
data delivery, and an automatic payment process without
the need for a TTP. These processes are described in
detail in the following sections.
C. Data Access Agreement Model
The commercial agreements described in project T1010 [5]
have guided our selection of the components included in the
SC regarding agreement between the data provider and data
consumer
Fig.4 illustrates the structures of these components and for
the sake of simplicity we have chosen the most relevant ones
but of course this can be modified and expanded in the future.
For each new agreement between provider and consumer, two
new records will be added to the ledgers that are shared
to them. The first one will hold information on the settled
agreement between the data consumer and data provider. The
second one is an accounting record used in enforcing the
data cost and compensation. To assure the data IPR, the data
provider is the one who has the ownership of the provided data.
Thus, no one else has the right to advertise an offer for the
same data and this is warranted by the uploaded hash values
of the data. The data consumer could be a data provider after
developing and modifying the procured data to generate data
with a higher level of processing before advertising data to the
network for others. This process will lead to the generation of
different hash values for the modified data which will connect
Fig. 4. Data structure.
it to the new owner and keep their right to create a new offer
to advertise their data.
In the setting-up phase of the system, all nodes of either
providers or consumers must be registered with the trusted
authority and they must have their IDs and public/private key
pair before participating. The adopted consensus mechanism
should be chosen as well.
The process flow is as follows :
1) The consumer will send a request determining the offer
(offer ID) they are interested in to the SC along with
the subscription period and payment
2) The SC will check the validity of the requested offer. If
not valid, then the request will be rejected. If the offer is
still available, a payment process is initiated; this process
is discussed in detail in the following section.
3) If the payment process is completed, an agreement
between the provider and consumer will be generated
automatically.
4) Both provider and consumer will be notified about the
established agreement.
5) The provider will use the consumer’s public key to
encrypt the original data and their private key to sign
it before uploading the data onto the external storage.
6) Based on the agreement, the consumer will gain
access to the original data on an off-chain chan-
nel (external storage) and access to the hash
values on-chain. Original data should be signed
then encrypted on the external storage as follows:
consumerPublicKey(providerPrivateKey(Data)).
7) The consumer will decrypt the data and hash it to
compare it with the hash values provided on-chain to
check its integrity.
8) It is the consumer’s responsibility to use the hash values
to ensure the integrity of the original data. Two types of
malicious behavior from the provider side can be proven
in our model:
a) Sending corrupted or incomplete data;
b) Latency in providing hash values to the con-
sumer.
9) The agreement generated can be revoked before the
dedicated expiry date by the provider or the consumer.
This process is irreversible, i.e. when the state is changed
to False (revoked), no one is allowed to activate it again
to True. Instead, a new agreement must be initiated from
Fig. 5. Data access agreement sequence model.
step 1.
Fig.5 illustrates the sequence of creating the data access
agreement.
D. Accounting Model
In any trading platform, the payment process can be man-
aged using a post-paid or pre-paid model. The former implies
a trust in the consumer (buyer) that if the data is received
correctly first, the payment will be made as agreed. The latter
implies a trust in the provider that if the payment is made as
agreed, the data will be sent after. None of the previous models
guarantee full satisfaction for both provider and consumer and
both carry some risk in case one party decides to misbehave.
Therefore, there is a need for a TTP to provide an escrow
service for both provider and consumer.
In our proposal, to eliminate the need for a TTP, an SC will
be used as an escrow which holds the consumer’s payment
and performs the process of payment to the provider after the
data is sent and the consumer confirms it has been received
as agreed, which will be implied by the consumer continuing
their agreement with the provider without revoking the request.
Also, the escrow SC will hold the penalties that both provider
and consumer would pay in advance of any data transfer
process. Penalties will be used if there is malicious behavior
by either or both. Otherwise, the penalties are reimbursed to
both parties if there is no complaint and the data trading is
going smoothly conforming to the agreement.
With each offer, the provider is responsible for deploying
the following attributes and values as depicted in Fig.4:
Dp: The price of the data to be shared in a determined
period (daily/weekly/monthly/quarterly/annually).
E : The deposit both consumer (Ec) and provider (Ep)
should pay to build an escrow as a penalty for any behavior not
conforming to the agreement. This value may be determined
by a special process by following predefined legalization rules.
The determination of prices and deposit values is an economic
topic in the rail industry that goes far beyond our aim in this
work. Since it is out of our scope in this phase, we will assume
that accepted offers have applied the predefined restrictions
and rules.
h(D) : The hash value of the data this provider is sharing.
Payment process flow is as follows:
1) When the consumer selects an offer, they will initiate
the escrow SC by sending the payment and the deposit
as determined in the offer.
2) The provider will be notified of the request and will
check the payment and deposit; if they both match their
agreement, the provider will pay their deposit, which
should not be less than the consumer’s deposit, to lock
the escrow. Otherwise, if the payment does not match,
the process will be rejected and the consumer will get
their payment back.
3) When the three values (payment, consumer’s deposit,
and provider’s deposit) are paid, an SC to initiate an
agreement will be triggered, in which the period of
access to the data is determined.
4) Based on the consumer’s satisfaction, they will decide
to proceed with the agreement or revoke it, or claim
a breach from the provider’s side by providing the
(providerprivateKey(Data)) at any point. The provider
also has the same ability to revoke the agreement but
they would lose their deposit in that case.
• If the agreement period has ended without any revo-
cation or claim, both will receive their deposit back
without any deductions. In addition, the provider
will receive the payment as agreed. Similarly, In the
case of revocation without any claim, the payment
will be calculated based on the period the consumer
had access to the data before revoking the agree-
ment;
• If the consumer submits a claim that is one of two
kinds, a mismatched claim or latency claim, the
following applies:
a) In a mismatch claim, the consumer will
provide the received data which is signed using the
provider’s private key to the SC alongside the date
of receipt. Then, the SC will hash the provided data
after verifying the source using the provider’s public
key. Next, the hashed value will be compared to
the one stored on-chain. In the case of a mismatch,
the consumer will be refunded part of the payment
based on the claim date and will receive both de-
posits as compensation. The agreement between the
consumer and provider will be revoked at this point
to prevent the consumer from future free access.
In contrast, if the hashes match, the provider will
receive payment based on the claim date and will
receive both deposits as a penalty for this frivolous
complaint. The agreement between them will be
revoked as well.
b) In a latency claim, the dates of hashed data
on the chain will be checked to verify whether
or not the provider submitted the hashed data on
an acceptable timeline using the block’s timestamp.
Also, the agreement will be revoked.
Fig.6 shows a graph tree depicting all the possible scenarios
in trading data between the consumer and provider and how
the cost is calculated based on the behavior of consumer and
provider.
Before illustrating how the cost will be calculated in each
scenario, we will define the acronyms used in the following
equations:
• CPayment :The initial payment the consumer will make
to initiate the escrow along with Ec. This payment rep-
resents the final price of the whole life of the agreement.
• ActPrice : The actual price of the consumed data based
on the service period; this value should be less than or
equal to CPayment.
• PReimbursement: The actual reimbursement that will be
transferred to the provider depending on the service
period and consumer satisfaction, which is reflected by
agreement status and resolution of any claims.
• CRefund: Refunds which will be transferred to the con-
sumer based on the agreement status and resolution of
any claims.
Three different dates will affect the actual price value
(ActPrice):
• RevDate : The revocation date which will be the same
as the time stamp of the block including the revoked
agreement.
• StartDate: The agreement’s start date; this will be de-
clared in the agreement as an attribute.
• EndDate: The agreement’s end date; this will be declared
in the agreement as an attribute.
Scenario A: The provider sends genuine data and the
consumer has a real claim about the latency in appending
the hashes to the network. The agreement will be revoked,
triggering the SC to calculate the costs as follows:
ActPrice = Dp ∗ (RevDate–StartDate)
PReimbursement = ActPrice
CRefund = (CPayment–ActPrice) + EP + EC
(1)
Scenario B: The provider sends genuine data and the con-
sumer makes a frivolous claim about data integrity or latency
in appending the hashes to the network. The agreement will
be revoked, triggering the SC to calculate the costs as follows:
ActPrice = Dp ∗ (RevDate–StartDate)
PReimbursement = ActPrice + EP + EC
CRefund = CPayment–ActPrice
(2)
Scenario C: The provider sends genuine data and the
consumer makes no claim but wants to revoke the agreement
for another reason such as finding another resource for the
same service. The agreement will be revoked, triggering the
SC to calculate the costs as follows:
ActPrice = Dp ∗ (RevDate–StartDate)
PReimbursement = ActPrice + EP
CRefund = (CPayment–ActPrice) + EC
(3)
A similar scenario occurs when the agreement expires without
any revocation or complaint from the consumer’s side:
ActPrice = Dp ∗ (EndDate–StartDate)
PReimbursement = ActPrice + EP
CRefund = (CPayment–ActPrice) + EC
(4)
Scenario D: The provider sends falsified data and the
consumer makes a real claim about data integrity or latency in
appending the hashes to the network if was not aware about
the falsified data. The agreement will be revoked, triggering
the SC to calculate costs in a similar way to equation (1)
in scenario A. The consumer will be compensated and the
provider will get part of the total payment and will lose their
deposit.
Scenario E: The provider sends falsified data and the con-
sumer makes a frivolous claim about the latency in appending
the hashes to the network. The agreement will be revoked,
triggering the SC to calculate the costs in similar way to
equation (2) in scenario B. The provider will be compensated
and the consumer will lose their deposit.
Unfortunately, as the consumer is the only source of the
actual received data, if they do not recognize falsified data,
they will lose their deposit and the costs calculation will be the
same as in scenario B. As everything is recorded permanently
on the network, the consumer can raise a claim to the dispute
board and prove it at any time after the agreement is revoked
as long as they still have the signed original data.
Scenario F: The provider chooses to revoke an agreement
as they are no longer capable of providing the data. Costs will
be calculated in similar way to equation (1) in scenario A by
which the consumer will be compensated and the provider will
get part of the total payment and will lose their deposit.
In our proposal, the malicious behaviors that can be proven
against the consumer are frivolous complaints and data re-
selling. If the provider revokes the agreement due to notifying
provable malicious behavior such as data reselling, they can
raise the claim with the proof; otherwise, they will lose their
deposit. Actually, to prove data reselling, the provider should
get access to the hash values as a consumer first. A provider
is not allowed access to the hash values appended by other
providers unless they are one of the consumers. This type of
case may lead to legal action and should be managed by the
dispute board.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND FUTURE WORK
Based on their permission levels, blockchains are pri-
marily categorized as public/permissionless blockchain net-
works or private/permissioned blockchain networks. A public
blockchain network, e.g. Bitcoin, is open to the public to
Fig. 6. All possible scenarios in trading data.
join, i.e. anonymous participants have uniform access privi-
leges to the network ledger. Therefore, it imposes a powerful
consensus mechanism to preserve security; the most popular
consensus algorithm used in public blockchains is Proof-of-
Work [27]. In contrast, in private networks, the participant
should be known and identified to restrict their access to the
ledger. In our framework, the identities of all the participants
in the network should be known. Therefore, the proof of
concept will be implemented using a blockchain network
supporting the auditing and tracking process. There are several
blockchain platforms that could be employed in implementing
the proposed model. Determining the most appropriate one
has a considerable influence on the design as there are no
one-size-fits-all-platform blockchain initiatives. Therefore, a
tradeoff analysis was conducted on the most used blockchain
platforms: Ethereum [27], [28], Fabric [29], Sawtooth [30],
and Iroha [31] based on the criteria listed below in Table I.
TABLE I
TRADEOFF ANALYSIS BETWEEN ETHEREUM, FABRIC, SAWTOOTH, AND
IROHA.
Criteria Blockchain Platforms
Ethereum Fabric Sawtooth Iroha
Supports smart contracts. X X X X
Consensus algorithm modularity. × X X ×
Built-in components for managing.
identities. × X × X
Supports payment in fiat currency. × X X X
Proficient in maintaining different
privacy levels between users. × X X X
Automation of all the processes discussed will be through
an SC that is implemented in Turing-complete languages.
Ethereum uses Solidity, a new programing language that pro-
vides reasonable but is expensive and to some extent limited
in implementing complex contract terms. The other platforms
support more profound programing languages such as Java,
Go, Rust, and C++. Additionally, Iroha is focused heavily
on supporting the development of mobile applications and
embedded systems alongside web applications. This platform
provides a set of libraries and prebuilt components including
predefined SCs and queries that will facilitate the adoption of
distributed ledger technologies into IoT infrastructure. There-
fore, Iroha might be useful in complementing Fabric and
Sawtooth platforms by providing reusable components.
Ethereum, as a public blockchain in origin, handles the
abuse of trust by imposing a proof-of-work (PoW) consensus
algorithm which is known to be rigorous but power and
time consuming due to the mining process and propagation,
while the Fabric and Sawtooth platforms supports several
consensus algorithms which can be changed on the fly while
the network is running, which make them adaptive to different
environments. Additionally, consensus modularity will give us
the ability to implement our proposal with different consensus
mechanisms to examine and measure the throughputs accord-
ing to each one. Iroha embraces its own consensus algorithm, a
crash fault-tolerant consensus called Yet Another (aka YAC).
In fact, consensus protocols in private blockchain avoid all
unnecessary hurdles and complexities since reaching a total
agreement on the common truth between predefined identities
will be easier and faster.
Ethereum maintains anonymity in a way that any node can
join or leave with no restrictions. This does not serve our
purposes in this research because it is essential to identify
each participant in the network. Hyperledger Fabric provides
MSP and CA services to identify the participant in an easy
and manageable way. Sawtooth does not have a CA service
similar to the one in Fabric, thus the developer might need to
integrate external identity software. Iroha, on the other hand,
has an intrinsic support for identity management as well.
Ethereum incurs fees (gas) in exchange for every SC
execution and has its own native payment currency (Ether)
while the Hyperledger platforms Fabric, Sawtooth, and Iroha
are cryptocurrency-independent and payment in fiat currencies
is available.
The proposed framework dictates the variation of privacy
level between users, i.e. not all agreements and payment
processes are available for all network users. Some users may
choose to have a private agreement and keep the cost attribu-
tion hidden from others who are not involved in that agree-
ment. Ethereum maintains an identical role for all participants,
and all transactions are available and visible to all participants
in the network, while Hyperledger platforms are able to satisfy
this requirement by one way or another. In Fabric, this issue is
managed by creating a separate channel to isolate participants
that need private agreements and cost attributions, while in
Sawtooth, changing the identity namespace in the transaction
family will restrict access to certain identities. Similarly, in
Iroha, defining access control rules will maintain convenient
role-based access at different levels.
All in all, a permissioned blockchain network seems to
be the best choice to fulfill the predefined design decisions
we mentioned before in our framework when considering
faster settlement, scalable performance, and a more controlled
environment.
In order to evaluate our proposal to improve trust, automate
a fair cost attribution process and payment, and enforce
agreements between parties, we look to apply it to related
cases in the rail industry. To this end, two case studies will
be examined against the proposed framework in our empirical
study to validate the outcome. The first case study will be
the Unattended Overhead Line Equipment Monitoring System
(UOMS), a train-based system monitoring infrastructure. The
second will be an acoustic axle bearing monitoring system
(RailBAM), an infrastructure-based system monitoring trains.
In UOMS, equipment is mounted on a CL390 train and
used to monitor and measure the health of the pantograph
line which belongs to the infrastructure. In the second case
study, RailBAM, the acoustic devices are mounted on the
main infrastructure track and used to monitor the axle journal
bearing upon which the wheel of rolling stock is rotating. Both
case studies involve cooperation between different stakehold-
ers across the rail industry. In other words, there are several
parties in the rail industry interested in the data generated
in both case studies, such as Network Rail, Train Operating
Companies (TOCs), Freight Operating Companies (FOCs),
and other train manufacturers and maintainers. The results of
applying our proposal using these two case studies will be
reported to the community in future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cross-industry RCM is a vital process in the rail industry
owing to its necessity to improve service quality and safety,
and to save costs. Therefore, intelligent devices and sensors are
extensively attached to infrastructure and trains to capture data
about rail assets and then used in decision-making and main-
tenance process guidance. To derive the maximum benefits,
it is essential to coordinate the business process among the
stakeholders who pay for these devices and those who gain
access to the data to obtain knowledge from this collected
data about their assets. In fact, trading data is providing a net
business benefit as this data will eventually be used to improve
railway service quality and cut costs.
The current process adopted to regulate agreements between
facilitators and beneficiaries is not settled well and is done in
very conventional way. Moreover, some of the coordinating
agreements are gentlemen’s agreements that are easy to tamper
with and create untraceable dispute evidence. That is, they may
lead to unfair cost attribution, disputes between parties, and
misuse in some cases. In addition, the current agreements do
not protect the facilitator’s rights in owning the data as they
are not tamper-resistant.
We have introduced a new framework based on blockchain
technology to solve all the aforementioned issues. Our frame-
work regulates the whole process and grants data ownership
to the facilitator as long as they provide the hash values
to the blockchain network. It simplifies the communication
process between data provider and data consumers, automates
agreement building, and automates cost attribution based on
the built agreement. To some extent, the proposed framework
provides a service level agreement between provider and
consumer, i.e. both may claim some breaching behaviors. For
example, a consumer may claim poor service quality, prove
their claim, and be compensated; otherwise, the consumer will
be fined for making a frivolous claim.
We are hoping the proposed framework is tailored in a
way that will solve most of the vulnerabilities in the current
situation and will move the condition monitoring process
to a higher maturity level. We believe it will encourage all
stakeholders to engage in protecting their data and to generate
some revenue from their data. All the anticipated features will
be examined in the empirical study and we will report to the
community in the near future.
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